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Sent: Wednesday, August 01, 2012 5:36 AM
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Sir/Ma'am,

We (ATEC) have determined that DCGS-A DSB 1.0 is Effective with Significant
Limitations, Not Suitable, and Not Survivable as a result of operational
testing and evaluation. ATEC executed a planned and approved traditional
initial operational test (IOT) in May -June 2012. However, it was not
sufficient to adequately stress this complex system. We are starting to see
the complexity of network systems like WIN-T Inc2 and DCSG-A exceed the role
of the transition OT paradigm. The paradigm needs to formally shift to a
testing environment like to the NIE with a full Brigade size element with a
full chain of command and stressing scenario-based operations. NIE 12.2 was
not ready to handle both WIN-T Inc2 and DCSG-A operational tests (SUT)
simultaneously. The NIE needed mature to handle these systems and it did.
Due to system complexity, system role as a central intelligence fusion
system and the rapid pace of software development, DCSG-

A warrants a
continuous test and evaluation approach. Same holds true for WIN-T Inc2.
ATEC plans to move forward with a follow-on T&E approach using laboratory
tests as entrance criteria and formally stress the DCGS-A DSB 1.1 as a
SUT/FOTE beginning with NIE 13.1 through 13.2 to accommodate both
classification levels. Note: Both WIN-T Inc 2 and DCSG-A are already
programmed for these NIEs. This approach will provided the Army with a
continuing evaluation as the DSGS-A matures enabled by the robust testing
environment offered in NIE. The following narrative provides the rationale
for the ratings. These are emerging results. The Operational Evaluation
Report is being written and will provide the extensive details of the
evaluation:

Effective with Significant Limitations

DCGS-A DSB 1.0 provides integrated SIGINT processing, exploitation, and
dissemination (PED) capability using S3B software at the brigade level.
Given the legacy system today does not have a cross domain solution (CDS)
capability at BCT, DSB 1.0 provides a capability to sanitize SCI products
for release and dissemination via a CDS to the collateral enclave to support
the all-source products and the target nomination

process. However, the
current CDS (Radiant Mercury) is at the end of its lifecycle and the Program
Manager must seek a new solution. The Intelligence Fusion process is
technically met, but is operationally cumbersome due to inefficient internal
workflows.

DCGS-A DSB 1.0 provides integrated HUMINT functions (Source Operations,
Interrogation Mgmt, Requirements Mgmt, Production Mgmt, Role Based Access
Controls (RBAC) and Protected Workspace) in the Human Domain (HD) software,
which was technically verified in DT.   However, the software has limited
effectiveness given it is improperly placed on high side enclave.

DCGS-A DSB 1.0 provides integrated collection management functions with the
ISR Synchronization Tool (IST). IST was technically verified in DT, but has
limited effectiveness given IST is improperly placed on high side enclave.

Not Suitable

Poor reliability was observed in the low OPTEMPO IOTE environment. Server
failures that resulted in reboots/restarts were recorded every 5.5 hours of
test. TS/SCI enclave workstation operators experienced a failure every 10.8
hours of active usage. Based on observations across many

programs, we
expect that high OPTEMPO conditions will decrease reliability further still,
which would increase FSR workload and reduce the availability of unoccupied
workstations. In addition, we observed a possible correlation between
reliability failure events and target alert/alarm delays on the workstations.

Similarly, the hardware and software "ease of use" characteristics
negatively impacted operator confidence and increased their frustration.
For example, multiple open screens are required to complete a single task,
workstation freeze-ups due to these multiple windows being open, and having
to convert data into different formats added steps and may have introduced
data transfer errors.

New Equipment Training (NET) provided users adequate information to properly
operate DCGS-A DSB 1.0. Of those who attended NET, 93% stated they were
able to effectively execute functions, and 85% stated they were confident in
their ability to complete their tasks. They also stated they would prefer
more simulated practical exercises and additional hands on experience during
NET to help alleviate system complexity. One limitation of NET was the lack
of emphasis on using the M1085 Medium Tactical Vehicle (MTV) organic

mechanical lift to assist with re-location/jump operations - which should
mitigate some safety concerns regarding Soldier lift limitations.

Not Survivable

The Threat Computer Network Operations Team (TCNOT) was able to identify and
exploit several vulnerabilities with DCGS-A DSB 1.0. The TCNOT results were
shared with PM DCGS-A for their awareness of the vulnerabilities that
require mitigation. AEC has recommended that the PM issue a Tech Bulletin
to address one vulnerability to DCGS-A units already fielded and document
plans and a timeline for mitigating the rest in an updated Plan of Actions
and Milestones (POA&M). AEC will elevate the assessment to Survivable with
Limitations if the PM provides sufficient documentation that the Tech
Bulletin has been issued and the remaining exploitable vulnerabilities are
mitigated prior to the Fielding Decision.

Issues for consideration: Given today's software development methodologies,
complex system, which DCSG-A is, require a new assessment paradigm, in which
the incremental capability that are built over time, are incrementally
assessed in operational environments as the builds are delivered.

In the case of DCGS-A, the PM is already working on future

versions that
provide new concepts of operation, will be based on a new framework and are
slated to address many of the shortcomings we have identified during the
course of IOTE. As such, we propose to revaluate the finding of IOTE as
well as test the new functionality these follow-on builds bring at the
appropriate NIE events in which they will participate. These proposed
efforts will serve to better inform the Army of the progress of the program.
The results will serve as entrance criteria for interoperability
certification of capability sets maturity. This approach is consistent with
the emerging agile process capability set alignment and fielding
determinations. ATEC also recognizes that there are other versions DSCG-A
functioning on the battlefield today.

We have a briefing that lays these points. The DOTE position will be mostly
be Not Effective, Not Suitable, and Not Survivable.

v/r

MG Dellarocco